The Jurisprudence of Justice Amy Coney Barrett

Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System

Question Presented: First, whether a defendant in a securities class action may rebut the presumption of classwide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements in showing that the statements had no impact on the price of the security, even though that evidence is also relevant to the substantive element of materiality. And, second, whether a defendant seeking to rebut that presumption has only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion.

Holding: The generic nature of a misrepresentation often is important evidence of price impact that courts should consider at class certification. And the Court's precedents require defendants to bear the burden of persuasion to prove a lack of price impact by the preponderance of the evidence.

Van Buren v. United States

Question Presented: Whether a person who is authorized to access information on a computer for certain purposes violates Section 1030(a)(2) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act if he accesses the same information for an improper purpose.

Holding: An individual “exceeds authorized access” when he accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains information located in particular areas of the computer—such as fles, folders, or databases—that are off-limits to him.

Florida v. Georgia

Question Presented: Whether Florida proved that Georgia's water use caused harm justifying an equitable apportionment decree.

Holding: Florida failed to prove its case; the action was dismissed.

United States Fish and Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club, Inc.

Question Presented: Whether Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5) (2012), by incorporating the deliberative process privilege, protects against compelled disclosure a federal agency's draft documents that were prepared as part of a formal interagency consultation process under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1536, and that concerned a proposed agency action that was later modified in the consultation process.

Holding:The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure under FOIA in-house draft biological opinions that are both predecisional and deliberative, even if the drafts refect the agencies' last views about a proposal.

Fulton v. Philadelphia

Question Presented: Whether Philadelphia violated the Free Exercise Clause by refusing to contract with a Catholic foster-care agency unless it certified same-sex couples.

Holding: The refusal violated the Free Exercise Clause because the city's system allowed discretionary exemptions.

Barrett's View: Many Court observers thought the Supreme Court would use this case to overrule Employment Division v. Smith, which held that a neutral and generally applicable law typically does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. (Justice Alito's concurrence, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, proposed doing just that.) But Justice Barrett wrote separately to state that "the historical record is more silent than supportive on the question whether the founding generation understood the First Amendment to require religious exemptions from generally applicable laws in at least some circumstances." While she believes that the textual and structural arguments against Smith are compelling, she declined to overrule the precedent here given the scant historical evidence and the uncertainty around what kind of judicial scrutiny would replace Smith were it overruled.

South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom

Question Presented: Whether to grant emergency injunctive relief against a California Covid-19 regulation.

Holding: The Court granted the stay in part and denied it in part. The Court held that California could not enforce its prohibition on indoor worship services against the applicants pending disposition of their petition for writ of certiorari.

Barrett's View: Justice Barrett concurred in part. She noted that in her view, the applicants did not carry their burden of showing that they were entitled to relief from California's "singing ban." But she added that "if a chorister can sing in a Hollywood studio but not in a church, California's regulations cannot be viewed as neutral."